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COMMENTS
SENATE BILL 42-THE END OF THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
For more than fifty-nine years California had a system of
indeterminate sentences for felony convictions.' The indeter-
minate sentence system prohibited the sentencing judge from
specifying a designated term of imprisonment for each con-
victed felon, and required the felon to be sentenced for "the
term prescribed by law." 2 As a result, each felon was sent to
prison for a term having a statutory minimum and maximum
length, without any indication of the length of term that that
specific prisoner would serve. Each individual's term was set
after incarceration by the "governing authority of the prison,"3
based on that individual's conduct in prison.' In theory, the
indeterminate sentencing system would allow each prisoner's
sentence to be tailored to his rehabilitative efforts in prison,
enabling each individual to be released as soon as he was capa-
ble of living in society without resorting to crime.
A number of different criticisms5 were leveled at the ad-
ministration of the law-the uncertain date of release, the
varying sentence lengths for prisoners committed on similar
offenses, the broad discretion of the Adult Authority, the Au-
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1. The original indeterminate sentencing provision, Penal Code section 1168, was
enacted on May 18, 1917, and became effective on July 27 of the same year. 1917 Cal.
Stats., ch. 526, § 1, at 665 (a lengthy historical note is included after the section).
2. The term prescribed by law was a statutory minimum and maximum term for
the offense for which the defendant was convicted. A recital of the offense of which
the defendant was convicted and a designation of the state prison to which he was
committed was upheld as a proper sentencing in People v. Mendosa, 178 Cal. 509, 173
P. 998 (1918).
3. 1917 Cal. Stat., ch. 526, § 1, at 665. The governing authority of the prison
was orginally called the State Board of Prison Directors. In 1941 it became the Board
of Prison Terms and Parole and in 1944, the Adult Authority.
4. See notes 41-61 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of the Adult
Authority's method of determining sentences.
5. See, e.g., J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS 81
(1973) [hereinafter cited as MITFORD]; Sacramento Bee, Feb. 28, 1975, at BI, col. 3;
Transcript of the Hearing on the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Sen. Select Comm. on
Penal Institutions, Dec. 5-6, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Transcript]. See also M. FRAN-
KEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES 88 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FRANKEL].
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thority's relative immunity from effective review, and the lack
of effective evaluation of available sentencing materials by the
Adult Authority.'
These criticisms, however, were only symptoms of the real
problem, which was that the fundamental premise upon which
the system was based, that is, the ability to rehabilitate was
not a viable concept.7 The criticisms generated an Adult Au-
thority attempt to promote uniformity and order within the
law' which was ultimately invalidated by the courts as beyond
the Adult Authority's power.'
Increasing criticism motivated the legislature to re-
examine the law and numerous alternatives were proposed.'0
From among the alternatives Senate Bill 42 was enacted as the
favored remedy. It was passed by the legislature on September
6. There was much criticism of the legislature's grant of total power for sentenc-
ing decisions to the Adult Authority without meaningful direction. Some of the
criticism came from members of the legislature themselves: "For years the Legislature
has neglected its responsibility of providing guidelines for boards charged with parole
decision making. . . . The Parol Board [the Adult Authority] is one of the last
bastions of unchecked and arbitrary power in America." ASSEM. SELECT COMM. ON
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, PAROLE BOARD REFORM IN CALIFORNIA: ORDER OUT OF CHAOS 15
(1970). See also FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 88-89; MITFORD, supra note 5, at 86; Gold-
farb & Singer, Problems in the Administration of Justice in California, ASSEM. J.
(Supp. App.), Reg. Sess. 41 (1969) (criticism of the absence of procedural due process
safeguards at Adult Authority proceedings).
General criticism of indeterminate sentencing was raised at the hearings of the
Senate Select Committee on Penal Institutions on Senate Bill 42. Transcript, supra
note 5.
7. See, e.g., ASSEM. COMM. ON CRIM. PROC., CRIME AND PENALTIES IN CALIFORNIA
25 (1968); CAL. ST. BAR COMM. ON CRIM. JUSTICE, REP. AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON SENT-
ENCING AND PRISON REFORM 1-4, 34-35 (1975); FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 90-92; Glueck,
Predictive Devices and the Individualization of Justice, 44 LAW & Contemp. Prob. 461-
62 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Glueck].
8. The major Adult Authority attempts to provide uniform procedures were
Chairman's Directives 75/20 and 75/30. Adult Authority Chairman's Directive 75/20
(April 15, 1975) [hereinafter cited as C.D. 75/201; Adult Authority Chairman's Direc-
tive 75/30 (September 2, 1975) [hereinafter cited as C.D. 75/30]. See notes 41-61 and
accompanying text infra for a description of C.D. 75/20 procedures. C.D. 75/20 involved
the procedure for determining parole release dates, while C.D. 75/30 paralleled those
procedures for setting an individual maximum term proportionate to the seriousness
of an individual's offense as required by In re Rodriquez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 652, 653, 537
P.2d 384, 393, 394, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552, 561, 562 (1975).
9. In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 238, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1976).
10. See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, at 4752 (formerly Senate Bill 42) (abol-
ishing most indeterminate sentences and the Adult Authority); A.B. 1440, Reg. Sess.
(1975) (requiring that sentences within the maximum length set by the trial judge, be
imposed by a panel of superior court judges or hearing officers shortly after incarcera-
tion); A.B. 2311, Reg. Sess. (1975) (establishing a Commission on Criminal Sanctions
to set fixed, determinate terms for all noncapital felony offenses at some point between
zero and the median national time served for similar crimes).
SENATE BILL 42
1, 1976, and signed into law by Governor Brown on September
20, 1976.11 The bill eliminates the Adult Authority and returns
California to a determinate sentencing system."2
This comment will examine the indeterminate sentencing
system and its administration. Senate Bill 42 will be outlined,
and the new sentencing system will be evaluated for its ability
to alleviate the difficulties of indeterminate sentencing.
A HISTORY OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
AND THE ADULT AUTHORITY
The Indeterminate Sentence Law
The indeterminate sentence law was enacted May 18,
1917, and became effective July 27 of the same year. 3 In its
original form, California Penal Code section 1168(a) provided:
Every person convicted of a public offense, for which pub-
lic offense punishment by imprisonment in any reforma-
tory or the state prison is not prescribed by law, if such
convicted person shall not be placed on probation, a new
trial granted, or imposing of sentence suspended, shall be
sentenced to be confined in the state prison, but the court
in imposing such sentence shall not fix the term or dura-
tion of the period of imprisonment."
The indeterminate sentence was a statutorily defined mini-
mum and maximum term for each felony. Within that statu-
tory term each prisoner's sentence was set after his incarcera-
tion by the governing authority of the prison.
The statute also provided that "the governing authority of
the reformatory or prison" or "any board or commission that
may be hereafter given authority so to do"' 5 had responsibility
for determining what amount of time, if any, greater than the
minimum the prisoner would be confined.
Although the indeterminate sentence law also consisted of
hundreds of provisions of the Penal Code and other codes defin-
ing minimum and maximum terms for each felony, this single
short section" was the backbone of the system. Other sections
11. Senate Weekly History, Reg. Sess. (1976).
12. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, at 4752 (legislative counsel's digest). See
notes 66-143 and accompanying text infra.
13. 1917 Cal. Stats., ch. 526, § 1, at 665.
14. Id. at 665-66.
15. Id. at 666.
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970).
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established the "governing authority of the prison," but none
provided direction for the administration of the law. 7 The
administrative board determining sentences was given total
control over the process of indeterminate sentencing.
Immediately after its enactment, the constitutional valid-
ity of indeterminate sentencing was unsuccessfully challenged
in In re Lee. '5 This challenge went to the core of indeterminate
sentencing-that is, to the right to make a sentence indetermi-
nate.
The contention that an indeterminate sentence was void
for uncertainty and indefiniteness was not accepted in Lee. The
court held that the sentence was in legal effect a sentence for
the maximum term, and thus, both certain and definite.'9 In
this holding the court relied on the experience of other jurisdic-
tions already possessing some form of indeterminate sentence.20
Lee also established the validity of giving sentencing dis-
cretion to an administrative body. It was alleged that the law
violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.2
The court replied by stating that the legislative function, to
provide the sentence to be imposed, was completed with the
enactment of the indeterminate sentence law and the mini-
mum and maximum terms for each felony. The judicial func-
tion, to determine guilt and impose sentence, was completed
at trial.2" The actual execution of the sentence was seen as a
purely administrative task.
Again, the court relied on precedents from other jurisdic-
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075 et seq. (West 1970).
18. 177 Cal. 690, 171 P. 958 (1918).
19. Id. at 693, 171 P. at 959.
20. Because the question was not raised, the Lee court did not go further and
examine whether the maximum sentence, often a life sentence, was cruel or unusual
punishment. Challenges to indeterminate sentencing on cruel or unusual punishment
grounds were not raised until very recently. See In re Rodriquez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537
P.2d 384, 122 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1975) (prison term disproportionate to inmate's particular
offense constituted cruel and unusual punishment and indicated that the Adult Au-
thority was not administering the law in a constitutional manner); People v. Wingo,
14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975) (a term within the statutory
limits that is disproportionate to individual culpability is unconstitutional); In re Foss,
10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1974) (a statutory minimum uncon-
stituional); In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972) (a
statutory maximum unconstitutional). The invalidation of sentences on this ground
fostered many changes in Adult Authority procedures. See, e.g., C.D. 75/30, supra note
8. It also pushed the Authority to repudiate rehabilitation as a sentencing criterion.
21. 177 Cal. at 692, 171 P. at 959. See CAL. CONST. art. III, § 3 (constitutional
doctrine of separation of powers).
22. 177 Cal. at 693, 171 P. at 959.
[Vol. 17
19771 SENATE BILL 42 137
tions having indeterminate sentences.13 It cited with approval
the Tennessee Supreme Court statement that "the act does not
attempt to confer on the board the power to fix the punishment
that any given crime shall bear." 4 Such a statement is belied
by the fact that the Adult Authority was given extremely wide
latitude in setting sentences. For example, the sentence for a
felony conviction of assault with a deadly weapon was six
months to life.25 At the time Lee was decided, the governing
authority of the prison had complete freedom to set an inmate's
sentence anywhere within those bounds."
As a result of Lee and its progeny," the validity of indeter-
minate sentencing per se was solidly established and criticism
was restricted to the governing body and its administration of
the law.
The Adult Authority
In 1944 the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles was abol-
ished and the Adult Authority was created as the agency to
administer the indeterminate sentence law. Originally, the
Adult Authority had three members. It later was expanded to
nine members who were appointed by the Governor and con-
firmed by the Senate.29 Section 5075 of the Penal Code directed
23. Id. at 693-94, 171 P. at 959.
24. Id. at 694, 171 P. at 960, quoting Woods v. State, 130 Tenn. 100, 113, 169
S.W. 558, 561 (1914)..
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245 (West 1970) (felony penalty). Under S.B. 42 assault
with a deadly weapon carries a sentence of 2, 3 or 4 years. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch.
1139, § 152, at 4790 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 245).
26. Prior to the decision in In re Rodriguez, the general rule was that a prisoner
had no vested right to a term fixed at less than the maximum sentence. In re Schoen-
garth, 66 Cal. 2d 295, 302, 425 P.2d 200, 204, 57 Cal. Rptr. 600, 603 (1967). As a result
terms were set and reset anywhere within the statutory bounds, if the prisoner violated
any Department of Corrections rules. Rodriguez limited this rule by requiring that the
maximum for each prisoner must not be disproportionate to the seriousness of the
prisoner's offense. 14 Cal. 3d at 652, 537 P.2d at 393, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 516. This
compulsion of proportionality was derived from United States and California constitu-
tional provisions against cruel and/or unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
27. See, e.g., Bennett v. People, 406 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Larsen, 44 Cal.
2d 642, 283 P.2d 1043, appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 928 (1955); Fleischer v. Adult
Authority, 202 Cal. App. 2d 44, 20 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1962); People v. Kostal, 159 Cal.
App. 2d 444, 323 P.2d 1020 (1958).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE §3000 (West 1970). Jessica Mitford described the Adult
Authority in this manner: "This board wields total, arbitrary despotic power over the
destinies and liberties of California's state prison population, not only while they are
in custody but also after they have been released on parole." MITFORD, supra note 5,
at 86.
29. CAL. PENAL CODE §5075 (West 1970).
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that, to the extent possible, the members selected should be
experienced in the fields of corrections, sociology, law, law en-
forcement, and education.'"
Statutes provided very little guidance for the Authority in
its administration of indeterminate sentencing. Penal Code
section 5076.1 directed the Authority to hold hearings at the
prisons as often as necessary to allow a full and complete exam-
ination of each inmate's file.3 As the size of the prison popula-
tion increased, the section was amended to give the Adult Au-
thority the power to employ hearing representatives to assist
the Authority in its time-consuming tasks of examining each
inmate's file, setting terms and making parole decisions.2
Most of the direction for the operation of the indetermi-
nate sentence law was provided by the Adult Authority itself.
In the absence of statutory direction, the Adult Authority regu-
larly issued policy statements, resolutions and chairman's
directives which specified exactly how the indeterminate sent-
ence law would be administered. 4
30. Id. Supposedly these special areas of knowledge would assist the Adult Au-
thority members in their task of determining sentence lengths. The former occupations
of the 1976 Adult Authority members included: Raymond Procunier, director of the
Department of Corrections; Raymond Brown, Oakland deputy chief of police; Manuel
Quevedo, Jr., San Bernardino police officer and member of the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Board; Robert Wood, state assemblyman and farmer; Rudy Garcia, com-
munity director of the state health and welfare agency, and Lt. Commander in the
United States Navy in charge of special court martials; Henry Kerr, Assistant Com-
mander, Los Angeles Police Department, Detective Division; Curtis Lynum, San Fran-
cisco District Director, FBI; Ruth Rushen, Los Angeles County Probation Department,
Probation Officer. Telephone conversation with Adult Authority personnel (March,
1976).
Marvin Frankel has spoken of these "experts" running our sentencing system as
follows: "In our easy adoration of expertise we have given over power to people of
dubious qualifications, subjected to little or no control." FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 88-
89.
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5076.1 (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added).
32. Id. In 1976 the Adult Authority employed about 29 hearing representatives
to assist the nine Adult Authority members. These 38 people were responsible for
hearing the cases of over 40,000 inmates in the custody of the Department of Correc-
tions. Telephone conversation with Adult Authority personnel (March, 1976).
33. For criticisms of the Adult Authority's operation of the indeterminate sent-
ence law see authorities listed in note 5 supra.
34. The distinctions among these documents is not clear. Both policy statements
and resolutions appear to be general declarations of Adult Authority decisions on
various topics. Chairman's Directives, on the other hand, are much more specific and
deal with detailed procedural matters. See, e.g., C.D. 75/30, supra note 8. The relative
importance of these statements, resolutions and directives in Adult Authority opera-
tions is not clear. Apparently, they differ only in the depth to which they cover the
subject matter.
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Rehabilitative Foundations of Indeterminate Sentencing
Indeterminate sentencing in the United States grew out of
notions of preventive confinement." Though early statements
of the rationale for indeterminancy were based upon a desire
to isolate the criminal from society,38 very shortly the purpose
of indeterminancy was subtly shifted from confining a prisoner
until he had reformed to the actual reformation itself.37 Shortly
after the enactment of California's indeterminate sentence law,
the California Supreme Court wrote: "The purpose of the inde-
terminate sentence law . . . is to mitigate the punishment
which would otherwise be imposed upon the offender. These
laws place emphasis upon the reformation of the offender. They
seek to make the punishment fit the criminal rather than the
crime." 3
The difficulty with attempting to make the punishment fit
the criminal rather than the crime lay in the limited ability of
the criminal justice system to identify and treat the cause of
crime. For years the administrators of the indeterminate sent-
ence law attempted to individualize rehabilitation through
sentencing while lacking the expertise and methods necessary
for treatment. The result was that sentencing was open to criti-
cism as arbitrary, excessive and unfair.39
In early 1975 when Raymond Procunier became chairman
of the Adult Authority, he recognized that rehabilitation could
not be achieved within the indeterminate sentencing system. 0
35. See Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the
Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 304-15 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz.
36. Zebulon Brockway, the long time superintendant of Elmaira Reformatory in
New York and an early proponent of indeterminate sentencing in the United States,
rejected both punishment and deterrence as rationales for sentencing and instead
proposed that all persons convicted of crimes should be confined to prison until they
could safely be returned to society. Z. BROCKWAY, FIFTY YEARS OF PRISON SERVICE 401
(1912).
37. See Dershowitz, supra note 35.
38. In re Lee, 177 Cal. 690, 692, 171 P. 958, 959 (1918).
39. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133-34 (1973);
FRANKEL, supra note 5.
40. Sacramento Bee, Feb. 28, 1975, at Bl, col. 3. There seems to be a general
consensus that rehabilitation, making a criminal into a law abiding citizen, is an
impossible task. See, e.g., FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 93; Friedman, The Dilemmas of
Sentencing, 44 CAL. ST. BAR J. 372, 377 (1969); Sacramento Bee, Feb. 28, 1975, at BI,
col. 3. Punishment, deterrence and protection decisions are really policy decisions
which demand less qualification than a rehabilitation decision. Senate Bill 42 recog-
nizes that these policy decisions are best made by a legislative body which is answera-
ble to the people rather than by an administrative board which is not.
1977]
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As a result, he attempted to remove rehabilitation from sent-
encing decisions. Chairman's Directive 75/20 was the result.
CHAIRMAN'S DIRECTIVE 75/20-AN ADMINISTRATIVE ATTEMPT TO
MAKE SENTENCING DECISIONS MORE UNIFORM
As a major step in administrative reform, Raymond
Procunier, the Adult Authority Chairman, issued Chairman's
Directive 75/20 (C.D. 75/20),11 which established a procedure
for setting parole release and discharge dates for each prisoner.
The parole release date was the length of time an inmate would
serve in prison before being released on parole. In a sense, it
was the inmate's individualized minimum term.42 The date was
tentative. If for any reason the inmate was found unfit to be
released, the date could be revoked.
The parole discharge date was the date on which the in-
mate would be released from the Department of Corrections'.
control and supervision after a successful period of parole. It
also was a tentative date because the individual's actions while
on parole could cause parole to be revoked or the time under
supervision to be lengthened.
The major purpose of C.D. 75/20 was to establish proce-
dures for evaluating information and guidelines for release de-
cisions. It was intended that these dates would be set at an
inmate's first regularly scheduled parole consideration meet-
ing. 43
The first section of C.D. 75/20 was administrative. It speci-
fied what information could be considered in making parole
release and discharge decisions, as well as what situations
would allow a postponement of decision or a denial of parole."
Postponement could be ordered only if the information at the
hearing was incomplete. The reason for postponement had to
41. C.D. 75/20, supra note 8.
42. Prior to the decision of In re Rodriguez, 14 Cal. 3d 639, 537 P.2d 384, 122 Cal.
Rptr. 552 (1975), a parole release date was only tentative. It could be revoked and the
sentence returned to the statutory maximum for any breach of prison discipline. After
Rodriguez the date could not be raised above the "primary term" which was a maxi-
mum proportionate to the individual's offense. See note 26 supra ; C.D. 75/30, supra
note 8 (establishing Adult Authority procedures for setting a proportionate maximum).
43. Such a meeting includes two Adult Authority members or hearing represent-
atives and the inmate. The purpose is to review his file and make recommendations
that will speed his release. The first scheduled meeting is six months before the
inmate's minimum eligible parole release date. Adult Authority Policy Statement No.
15 [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.1.
44. C.D. 72/20, supra note 8, at § A.1.
[Vol. 17
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be noted on a standardized form in the inmate's file45 and the
Department of Corrections' staff had to be instructed to obtain
the necessary information. In no situation could a case be post-
poned longer than ninety days.
C.D. 75/20 Procedures
The body of C.D. 75/20 was concerned with the procedure
to establish a parole release date-a procedure that involved a
number of different steps.
The "base offense." The "base offense" was the most seri-
ous offense for which the inmate had been sentenced." This
was determined by examining the statutory minimum and
maximum sentences for each offense for which the inmate had
been sentenced, selecting the most severe as the "base of-
fense," and listing that offense on the Adult Authority Parole
Decision form 279. If the inmate was committed for multiple
offenses, all offenses other than the base offense had to be listed
as running either concurrently or consecutively with that of-
fense.
The typical or aggravated range. The "base offense" was
then characterized as "typical" or "aggravated" for that type
of offense.47 To do this, the facts of the crime were evaluated
for their "relative seriousness" with respect to other crimes of
the same type. The directive listed several factors to be consid-
ered in making this determination, including the seriousness of
any personal injury to the victim of the crime, the number of
victims, the degree to which the inmate was involved in inflict-
ing such personal injury, the extent of damage to or loss of
property, the professionalism with which the crime was carried
out, the possession or use of weapons, and the quantities of
contraband possessed or sold.
No relative weights for each of these factors were supplied,
nor was there an instruction to disregard or alter factors which
were integral parts of the definition of an offense. Thus, in
effect, some factors were weighed twice-once as a definition
of the offense and again as a factor in determining the serious-
ness of the offense.
The base period of confinement. The base period of con-
45. California Department of Corrections form 279 [on file at SANTA CLARA L.
REv.I.
46. C.D. 75/20, supra note 8, at § A.2.a.
47. Id. at § A.2.b.
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finement 5 was established by referring to the table of suggested
base ranges attached to the directive. 9 The base offense and
the typical or aggravated character of that offense were used
to determine which average sentence range would be applied
to a particular prisoner. By evaluating the facts of a crime, a
specific period within that range was selected as the "base
period" of confinement for that inmate. The primary factor in
this determination was the seriousness of the offense, appar-
ently determined by using the same factors which allowed the
offense to be characterized as typical or aggravated. If there
were "unusual" factors in a particular case, the base period
could be set above or below the chosen range.'"
Adjusting the base period. The Adult Authority then ad-
justed the base period5' for prior prison terms, concurrent or
consecutive sentences, prior felony convictions plead and
proven in court which had not resulted in a prison sentence,
and weapons charges. 2 Periods of time were to be deducted
from the base period for an individual whose minimum term
had been reduced under Penal Code section 1202b, the Youth-
ful Offender Statute.53 The directive defined each of these
"mitigating" or "aggravating" situations, defined ranges to be
used to select the adjustment period for each,5" and cautioned
that the categories were mutually exclusive and that the same
felony convictions should not result in two additional periods
being added to the base. The directive also warned that dis-
missed charges were not to be considered in adjusting the base
range.
This last manipulation resulted in a specific period of
months. When added to the date on which the inmate was
48. Id. at § A.2.c.
49. For a table of suggested base ranges see app. A infra.
50. These factors include the individual's age; the individual's pattern of crimi-
nality (whether the individual is a professional, systematic criminal or an amateur,
occasional offender); serious or major disciplinary offenses in prison; a lengthy period
of incarceration prior to actual reception by the Department of Corrections, etc. C.D.
75/20, supra note 8, at § A.2.c.
51. Id. at § A.3.
52. Weapons charges include commission of a felony while armed with a deadly
weapon and use of a firearm in the commission of certain specified felonies. CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 12022, 12022.5 (West 1970).
53. The Youthful Offender Statute allows the sentencing court to reduce to six
months the minimum term of a defendant who was convicted of a felony, other than a
felony punishable by death, committed while he was under the age of 23 years. CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12026 (West 1970).
54. For a table of suggested adjustment ranges see app. A infra.
[Vol. 17
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received at the Department of Corrections, this period resulted
in the parole release date.55 The parole release date had to be
set beyond the minimum eligible parole date, which was gener-
ally one-third of the minimum sentence. 56
Parole discharge date. The directive specified that the nor-
mal period served under parole supervision was three years.
When the three-year period was added to the parole release
date, the parole discharge date was obtained.57 A parole period
other than three years might be selected if the reasons for that
decision were listed in the inmate's file. Since the parole dis-
charge date represented the individual's total sentence for his
offense, it had to be set at or beyond the statutory minimum
term.
Recalculation of dates. The periods established were only
tentative, based on the assumption that the inmate would
maintain a disciplinary-free record in the institution and would
satisfactorily perform any work assignments given him.5" If the
inmate's behavior did not meet these standards, he might have
his release and discharge dates recalculated.5" Also, if the in-
mate's "mental condition" deteriorated, his dates might be
rescinded. Deterioration of mental condition was not defined
nor was a review procedure for this decision established.
This procedure for the rescission of dates allowed parole
release to be postponed for virtually any reason. Charges of
prejudice were often leveled at Adult Authority decisions, but
they could seldom be proved because of poor documentation of
decision-making procedures. The directive provided for a type
of review procedure,"0 but the reviewcould only be made after
two-thirds of the time to parole release had been served. In
addition, the review did not consider the validity of the reasons
for the Adult Authority's release decision, nor did it examine
the propriety of the length of term before release. Instead, the
procedure required the inmate to demonstrate "unusual reha-
55. C.D. 75/20, supra note 8, at § A.4. If the adjusted based period for an individ-
ual who was received at a Department of Corrections institution on January 1, 1976,
was 24 months, his parole release date would be January 1, 1978.
56. Thus, if the minimum sentence for an offense was five years, the minimum
eligible parole date would be 20 months after incarceration.
57. C.D. 75/20, supra note 8, at § A.5. In the example in note 55 supra, the parole
discharge date would be January 1, 1981.
58. C.D. 75/20, supra note 8, at § C.
59. Id. at § D. Recalculation generally would result from additional court convic-
tions or prison disciplinary offenses.
60. Id. at § I.
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bilitation" to justify a resetting of his release and discharge
dates. This procedure did not allow Board error to be a factor
in a review of the dates. In addition, it establsihed rehabilita-
tion as the criterion for change when the procedures for setting
the dates initially did not even include rehabilitiation as a
factor.'
Invalidation of C.D. 75/20
The procedural inadequacies of C.D. 75/20 and the possi-
bilities of prejudice involved therein were overshadowed by the
glaring fact that the directive allowed for absolutely no consid-
eration of rehabilitation in the original sentence setting deci-
sion. The directive marked the Adult Authority's recognition
that rehabilitation was not a reasonable standard for determin-
ing sentences.
Unfortunately, the indeterminate sentence law required
individual sentences to be at least partially based on considera-
tion of factors of "individual reclamation and post-release
expectations."62 In other words, rehabilitation and the
prediction of recidivism were mandatory factors to consider
under the indeterminate sentence law.
In January, 1976, the California Court of Appeal for the
Third District decided the case of In re Stanley. 3 This case
invalidated C.D. 75/20 procedures on the ground that rehabili-
tation was not considered. Since the indeterminate sentence
law required consideration of rehabilitation in term setting,
and since the Adult Authority had admitted it could neither
rehabilitate nor 'evaluate efforts at rehabilitation, Stanley
seemed conclusively to establish that the goal of the indetermi-
nate sentence was beyond reach.
The dilemma of indeterminate sentencing has been stated
succinctly:
[I]t is time . . . that reformers of the criminal law face
the fact that the feasibility of a reliable technique of indi-
vidualization is crucial to the entire program of scientific
and humane criminal justice. If, in fact, a reasonably
61. Id.
62. In re Stanley, 54 Cal. App. 3d 238, 248, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524, 531 (1976). The
invalidation of C.D. 75/20 was predicted months before Stanley was decided. See letter
from G. Murphy, California Legislative Counsel, by B. Dale, Deputy Counsel, to Sen.
J. Nejedly (Mar. 18, 1975) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
63. 54 Cal. App. 3d 238, 126 Cal. Rptr. 524.
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sound individualization cannot be accomplished by the
means at hand, then, despite the lofty aims of modern
correctional philosophy and regardless of the most elabo-
rate investigation and case history, the system will not
work.64
When Stanley invalidated the Adult Authority's effort at a
reasonably workable and uniform sentencing procedure, the
California legislature was forced to act. Senate Bill 42 was
passed by the legislature on September 1, 1976. When the Gov-
ernor signed the Bill, indeterminate sentencing and the Adult
Authority were eliminated. 5
DETERMINATE SENTENCING UNDER SENATE BILL 42
Senate Bill 42 ends indeterminate sentencing and substi-
tutes a system of determinate sentences to be imposed by the
trial judge. The conceptual foundation of Senate Bill 42 is sig-
nificantly different than that for the indeterminate sentencing
system.
Senate Bill 42 defines the purpose of imprisonment for
crime to be punishment." This statement implicitly rejects the
other major theories of sentencing-isolation, deterrence and
rehabilitation. 7 Such a singleness of purpose, while removing
much of the flexibility inherent in indeterminate sentencing
promotes uniformity of sentencing for offenders committing
similar crimes under similar circumstances and eliminates the
difficult balancing of purposes which under indeterminate
sentencing led to disparity of sentences.
Sentence Lengths
All offenses are categorized into degrees of seriousness.
There are five levels of seriousness and each level is assigned
three definite terms." The three terms at each level represent
64. Glueck, supra note 7, at 461.
65. It should be noted that although Senate Bill 42 changed the law and, of
course, altered the procedures for setting prison terms, it did not substantially alter
the philosophy of sentencing. When C.D. 75/20 dropped rehabilitation as a sentencing
criterion, punishment and proportionality became the predominate themes in sentenc-
ing. Senate Bill 42 continued this emphasis and legitimated it.
66. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4818 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(a)(1)).
67. For a discussion of theories of punishment, see H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY (1968).
68. The categorization is not explicit in the Bill, but the statutes which assign
determinate terms yield only five levels of penalty.
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mitigated, typical and aggravated offenses at that level of seri-
ousness. For example, the middle level of seriousness is as-
signed terms of three, four and five years." One offense with
this degree of punishment is rape.7 A rape conviction would
normally result in a sentence for the middle term, but if the
sentencing judge finds that there were mitigating or aggravat-
ing factors involved, the lowest or highest term, respectively,
might be selected.7'
The major portion of Senate Bill 42 consists of statutes
defining the terms for each offense.72 Almost all of the new
sentences represent substantial reductions in sentence length
from the minimum and maximum statutory terms for the same
offense under the indeterminate sentence law.73 This change to
much shorter sentences was urged by proponents of the Bill for
two reasons-first, California had the longest average sent-
ences in the United States, and perhaps in the world, 4 and
second, sentences over about five years in length could not be
justified because there appears to be no significant "improve-
ment" in prisoners after that period.75
69. For a table of selected offenses with determinate and indeterminate penalties
see app. B infra.
70. CAL. PENAL CODE § 264 (West 1970). See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, §
154, at 4791 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 264).
71. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4819 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(b)). See notes 78-121 and accompanying text infra (trial court sentenc-
ing).
72. For a comparison of the penalties for various offenses see app. B infra.
73. Senate Bill 42 was severely criticized by Judge Bruce Allen, presiding judge
in the criminal division of Santa Clara County Superior Court, primarily because of
the extremely short sentences which it provides compared to those provided under the
indeterminate sentence law. San Jose Post-Record, Sept. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 1. This is
not necessarily accurate. Given the suggested base ranges which the Adult Authority
used for sentencing prior to the passage of Senate Bill 42, the new sentences should be
very close to the sentences actually served under the prior law. Compare app. A with
app. B infra.
74. See Transcript, supra note 5, at 20 (remarks of Peter Sheehan, American
Civil Liberties Union, San Francisco); MITFORD, supra note 5, at 86. Mitford com-
mented that "[ujnder cover of the indeterminate sentence, the median term served
by California's 'felony first releases' had risen from 24 months in 1960 to 36 months in
1970, highest in the nation and probably the world." Id.
75. To urge that sentences be reduced because rehabilitation is ineffective for
prisoners confined more than five years doesn't seem very persuasive since the basis
of S.B. 42 was punishment, not rehabilitation. It is likely, given the fact that Senate
Bill 42 seeks to establish sentences that are similar to those served for similar crimes
in other jurisdictions, that the first rationale urged for shorter sentences (that Califor-
nia's sentences were substantially longer than those in other jurisdictions) was given
much more weight by the legislature than the rehabilitation rationale.
The American Bar Association has noted that "[tihere is general agreement
among most who have recently studied the pattern of sentencing in this country that
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The sentence imposed may be increased by adding extra
periods of punishment for certain "enhancing" circumstan-
ces." Whenever an additional sentence is to be imposed under
any of the enhancement statutes, the court is authorized to
strike that additional punishment if it finds circumstances in
mitigation of the prescribed punishment and if the reasons for
striking are stated on the record." In addition, subdivision (d)
of section 1170.1a provides that the arming or use (of a weapon)
enhancements78 shall not apply when arming or use is an ele-
ment of the offense, nor shall the great bodily harm enhance-
ment" apply when that is an element of the offense.8" Further,
the average sentence to prison is for a term in excess of what can reasonably be justified
and that there are far too many long-term commitments." ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURE, Commentary at 56 (approved draft
1968).
Both the ABA Standards and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency's
Model Sentencing Act provide that the maximum statutory prison term for most
offenses should be no longer than five years; for serious offenses, ten years; and only
in unusual situations, twenty-five years. ABA Standard 2.1; COUNCIL OF JUDGES, NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT §§ 5-9 (2d ed.
1972). See also, SB 42-AB 1440-AB 2311: The Sentencing Struggle, THE OUTLAW:
J. PRISONERS UNION, June/July, 1975, at 3, col. 4.
Though Senate Bill 42 could yield sentences exceeding five years, it still represents
a decrease in sentence length from the indeterminate sentence system (under which
the average term actually served was generally longer than five years). See C.D. 75/30,
supra note 8. Senate Bill 42 represents a good faith effort to bring California sentences
within reasonable bounds and within the presently acceptable maximums.
76. These "enhancing" circumstances are various acts by the defendant, either
in the course of the offense for which he has been convicted or in the past, which the
legislature has determined will justify a longer sentence. These circumstances include
prior prison terms served, being armed with or using a weapon, the infliction of great
bodily harm, and the infliction of great property loss or damage. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv.,
ch. 1139, §§ 268, 304, 305, 305.5, 306 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5, 12022,
12022.5, 12022.6, 12022.7).
Under the indeterminate sentence law, only prior prison terms could result in an
extension of the prisoner's term. CAL. PENAL CODE § 664 (West 1970) (habitual offender
statute). This statute was repealed by Senate Bill 42. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139,
§ 261.5, at 4815. Other "enhancements" did not result in a statutory extension of a
term, but were considered by the Adult Authority under C.D. 75/20 as "adjustments"
to parole release dates. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra. The result due
to enchancements under the Bill is similar to that under C.D. 75/20. Compare app. A
infra (suggested adjustment ranges) with 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, §§ 268, 304,
305, 305.5, 306.
77. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4820 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.1a(c)).
78. Id. §§ 304, 305, at 4835 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022, 12022.5).
79. Id. § 306, at 4836 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7).
80. Id. § 273, at 4820 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.la(d)). For
example, a conviction for assault with a deadly weapon would not be subject to the
arming enhancement since being armed is an element of the offense.
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no more than one of these enhancements shall apply to the
sentence for any single offense. Here again, Senate Bill 42 very
clearly seeks to avoid double or excessive punishment as well
as to clarify the application of these enhancement provisions.
The indeterminate sentence law did not contain similar rules
of application and, as a result, sentences varied widely because
enhancement provisions were applied differently.
Enhancement for prior terms and consecutive sentences is
limited to five years8 and the total term of imprisonment is
limited to twice the number of years imposed as the "base
term,"" unless the defendant is convicted of a violent felony,83
being armed with a deadly weapon, the use of a firearm, or the
infliction of great bodily harm.84 If the conviction falls into one
of these exceptions, it appears that there is no limit on the total
term of imprisonment except for the limitation provided by the
number of enhancements which can be imposed by law.
Sentencing Procedure
Trial court sentencing. Section 1170 (a)(2) provides the
basic outline of sentencing procedure. 5 The trial court is re-
quired to sentence an individual convicted of an offense to one
of the three specified terms unless the defendant is given some
other disposition provided by law.8 At all times the court must
consider the sentencing rules prescribed by the Judicial Coun-
cil as authorized in section 1170.3,87 and it is required to impose
appropriate enhancements unless it finds mitigating circum-
stances.88
81. Id. § 273, at 4820 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1 (a(e)).
82. The base term is the unenhanced term selected by the trial judge from among
the three choices for any determinate offense.
83. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 268, at 4817 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667.5(c)) (definition of violent felonies).
84. Id. at 273, at 4820 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.la(f)).
85. Id. at 4818 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(2)).
86. Other dispositions include a fine, jail, probation or the suspension or imposi-
tion or execution of sentence. Id.
87. Id. at 4822 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3). The rules, which
the Judicial Council is required to develop, are to be designed to promote uniformity.
They must provide guidance for the court's decision to:
(a) Grant or deny probation.
(b) Impose the lower or upper prison term.
(c) Impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.
(d) Consider an additional sentence for prior prison terms.
(e) Impose an additional sentence for being armed with a deadly
weapon, using a firearm, an excessive taking or damage [to property],
or the infliction of great bodily injury.
88. Additional punishment due to aggravating circumstances can be avoided by
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When sentencing for an offense having three specified
terms, the court must order the middle of the three possible
terms, unless circumstances in mitigation or aggravation of the
crime are presented by motion and found to be true at a
hearing on that motion." A warning is given that no facts used
to enhance a sentence, such as prior prison terms for violent
crimes,9 consecutive sentences,' or use of a firearm, 2 shall
justify imposition of the aggravated (or upper) term, and that
no fact should be used twice to determine, aggravate or enh-
ance a sentence. This warning is a substantial change from the
procedures under the indeterminate sentence law where the
facts which define an offense could also be considered as aggra-
vating circumstances as well as conditions for enhancement. 3
establishing circumstances in mitigation of the punishment. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch.
1139, § 304-06, at 4835 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12022, 12022.5, 12022.6,
12022.7).
Penal Code section 12022.6 provides a punishment enhancement for excessive
taking of or damage to property
where the elements of the offense involve [the] criminal taking of funds
or property from or property damage to any individual, organization,
group or the community in general and [the offense does] not specify a
minimum value of the taking or damage, or [specifies] a minimum of
less than $100,000.
This enhancement has two levels depending on the magnitude of the taking or
damage. For a taking or damage greater than $100,000 but less than $500,000, the
enhancement is for an additional term equal to one-half of the base term selected by
the judge. If the taking or damage is equal to or greater than $500,000 then the en-
hancement is for a term equal to the base term selected by the judge. This new section
represents a recognition by the legislature that a serious property crime can be as
damaging to individuals and the community as a violent crime involving bodily harm
or a threat of bodily harm.
89. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 173, at 4819 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170(b)).
90. Id. § 268, at 4816 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5). New Penal
Code section 667.5(a) provides enhancement only if the commitment offense is one of
several defined "violent felonies" or a felony in which great bodily injury to a person
other than the defendant or his accomplices has been pled and proven and the prior
separate prison term also involved a "violent felony." The enhancement imposed is
an additional three year term for each such prior felony unless the felon was free of
prison custody and felony conviction for ten years immediately preceding the filing of
the accusatory pleading that resulted in the present felony conviction. In this section
the legislature specifically declares that these "violent felonies" merit special consider-
ation when imposing a sentence to display society's condemnation for such extraordi-
nary crimes of violence against the person.
Section 667.5(b) provides for one year enhancement for other prior prison terms
for any felony.
91. Id. § 273, at 4819 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1a).
92. Id. § 305, at 4836 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5).
93. See notes 41-61 and accompanying text supra (discussion of C.D. 75/20 proce-
dures).
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Whenever a mitigated or aggravated term is selected, the
facts relied upon must be set forth on the record. In fact, the
record must include all facts supporting the choice of sentence,
whether the mitigated, typical or aggravated term is chosen.
This requirement provides a more complete record, thereby
aiding appellate review of sentencing decisions.
A provision for resentencing within one hundred and
twenty days of commitment is retained from the prior law. 4
There are no significant changes in this provision, except for
the proviso that the trial judge in resentencing should apply the
rules and information provided by the Judicial Council regard-
ing sentences of other prisoners convicted of similar crimes.
To promote uniformity of sentencing, the Community Re-
lease Board, which is the successor to the Adult Authority and
the California Women's Board of Terms and Paroles," must
review all sentences within one year after commencement of
the terms thereof and recommend recall of the present sentence
and resentencing of the defendant if a sentence is found to be
disparate.
The California Judicial Council 7 has the responsibility for
establishing rules and procedures designed to foster the aims
of determinate sentencing-uniformity of sentencing and sent-
encing proportionate to the seriousness of the offense commit-
ted. " Accordingly, it is directed to establish criteria to aid the
94. Compare 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4819 (to be codified as
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(c)) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168 (West 1970).
95. The composition of Community Release Board is similar to that of the Adult
Authority. The Board includes nine members, each serving a four year term. 1976 Cal.
Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 294, at 4832 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 5075). Board
membership is required to reflect "as nearly as possible a cross-section of the racial,
sexual, economic and geographic features or the population of the state." Id. The
Board is responsible for reviewing all prisoner's requests for reconsideration of denial
of good time credit, and for setting parole length and conditions. In addition, it has
the authority to modify decisions of the Department of Corrections in these matters.
Id. § 297, at 4833 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 5077). In contrast to the Adult
Authority, the Community Release Board is authorized to do business in panels of
three rather than two. Compare id. § 296, at 4833 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 5076.1) with CAL. PENAL CODE § 5076.1 (West Supp. 1976). Since panels will probably
be conducted in groups of the lowest allowable number, the addition of one member
to the panel will prevent deadlocks.
96. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4820 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.1 b). This is another one of many provisions in the Bill designed to promote
uniformity of sentence.
97. The Judicial Council is established by the California Constitution. CAL.
CONST. art. VI, § 6.
98. See 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4822 (to be codified as CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1170.3 et seq.) (defining the duties of the Judicial Council under the
Bill).
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trial judge in his sentencing decisions,99 to collect, analyze and
distribute information on sentencing in California and other
jurisdictions; 00 to conduct annual sentencing institutes;"0 ' and
to review present sentencing statutes and procedures and rec-
ommend changes to the legislature.' The main objectives of
the Council in this review are to strive to maintain sentences
proportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and to assure
that California lawmakers remain abreast of current sentenc-
ing trends by comparing sentences in other jurisdictions and
sentencing procedures recommended by national commissions
and other learned bodies.0 3
Multiple convictions. Multiple convictions under Senate
Bill 42 are dealt with by a formula.' 4 The aggregate term for
all convictions is the greatest term imposed for any one of the
offenses for which the individual is convicted, including any
enhancement imposed for that offense, plus one-third of the
middle term of imprisonment for each other felony conviction
for which a consecutive sentence was imposed without any enh-
ancement for those additional offenses.10
5
Since no mention is made of concurrent sentences, it may
be presumed, from the failure to provide an aggravating term
for those sentences, that the terms are in fact to run concur-
rently. This is a distinct change from prior Adult Authority
policy which added time to the "base term" for concurrent as
well as consecutive sentences.' The Adult Authority proce-
dures considered additional convictions in establishing the se-
riousness of a commitment. They also added time to that sent-
ence as a penalty for sentences whose terms were, by definition
to run at the same time as the commitment offense. Senate Bill
42 clarifies the roles of concurrent and consecutive sentences by
allowing an extension of the sentence only in the case of convic-
99. See note 87 supra.
100. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4822 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.4).
101. Id. (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.5).
102. Id. (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.6).
103. Id. (listing of considerations).
104. Id. at 4819 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1a).
105. For example, a conviction for robbery with proof of great bodily harm and
an additional conviction for first degree burglary to run consecutively might be treated
as follows: 3 years (the middle term for robbery) plus 3 years (the enhancement for
great bodily harm, plus 1 year (one third of the middle term for burglary), for a total
sentence of seven years.
106. C.D. 75/20, supra note 8, at § A.3.b. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text
supra.
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tions intended to be served consecutively.
When an individual is convicted of a felony committed
while in prison, and his sentence is to run consecutively with
his present prison term, his term is calculated in the same
manner as for multiple convictions.' 7 His term is the remain-
der of time to be served on the original offense(s) plus the
greatest term imposed for any felony committed while serving
the original term plus one-third of the middle term for each
other felony conviction.
Sentences imposed prior to Senate Bill 42. All inmates
sentenced before the effective date of Senate Bill 42, who would
have been sentenced to a determinate term under the applica-
ble provisions of the new bill, will have their terms re-
calculated by the Community Release Board. This will be done
by utilizing the middle term of the most serious offense for
which the prisoner was convicted, aggregated by any additional
terms imposed at the time of sentencing.' If this calculation
results in a term which would end before the parole release date
already set by the Adult Authority,' then the inmate's parole
date must be reset at the shorter term. Resetting is mandatory
unless a majority of the Community Release Board determines
that a longer term is warranted due to the number of present
or prior convictions, or due to the presence of facts justifying
an arming, use or great bodily harm enhancement.
When a longer term is believed justified, the prisoner is
entitled to a hearing at which he may be represented by counsel
and in which the setting of his term and parole date will be
reviewed."' All inmates who have not had a parole date set by
the Adult Authority prior to the effective date of Senate Bill
42 shall have their terms calculated and parole dates set in the
same manner as that described above."' They also are entitled
to a review hearing if the Board decides that they should serve
a longer sentence than that calculated.
Inmates sentenced prior to the effective date of Senate Bill
42 who still have indeterminate sentences under the Bill will
have their release dates set by the Community Release Board
107. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 273, at 4820 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1170.la(b)).
108. Id. at 4821 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.2(a)).
109. See notes 41-61 and accompanying text supra (C.D. 75/20, Adult Authority
procedures for setting parole release dates).
110. The procedural guidelines for such a review are established by 1976 Cal.
Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 281.8, at 4827 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5).
111. Id. § 273, at 4821 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.2(c)).
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in the manner established by prior law." 2 Nothing in Senate
Bill 42 will require an inmate, sentenced before the effective
date of the Bill, to remain in prison longer than he would have
been kept in custody under the indeterminate sentence law.
Though the indeterminate sentence law is retained only in a
few provisions, mainly those providing terms of life imprison-
ment,"3 its procedure will continue to be relevant in setting
the terms of prisoners sentenced before the passage of Senate
Bill 42.
Good Time Credit
The second major procedural section of Senate Bill 42
deals with provisions for granting "good time" credit for time
served in prison."' Every prisoner with a determinate term
must be advised within fourteen days of the commencement of
his term of all applicable prison rules and available institu-
tional programs, including the possibility of receiving a reduc-
tion of up to one-third of his sentence for good time and partici-
pation."' All prisoners sentenced prior to the effective date of
Senate Bill 42 who will have determinate sentences must be
advised of the rules and programs within ninety days of the
Bill's effective date."' In all cases, the inmate's file must reflect
compliance with this provision.
At the time the prisoner is informed of the availability of
"good time," he must be shown a document, which both he and
a Department of Corrections official will sign, which outlines
the conditions for obtaining good time credit."' These condi-
tions may be modified by the mutual consent of the Depart-
ment and the prisoner, by transfer of the inmate to another
institution, or by the Department's determination of the pris-
oner's lack of adaptability and success in a specific program or
assignment. If lack of adaptability is claimed, the inmate is
entitled to a hearing on that decision."'
112. Id. at 4822 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.2(e)).
113. See, e.g., id. § 271, at 4818 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1168).
114. Id. § 276, at 4823 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2930-32). Good time
credits apply to all prisoners. Id. § 273, at 4822 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE §
1170.2(d)). However, prisoners sentenced prior to the effective date of the bill can
receive credit only from the effective date of the bill. Id.
115. Id. § 276, at 4823 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2930(a)).
116. Id. (to be codified s CAL. PENAL CODE § 2930(b)).
117. Id. (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2931(a)).
118. Id. at 4824 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2931(a)(3)).
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The documentation requirement in this section is un-doubtedly an effort to avoid the criticism that was directed at
the Adult Authority that each time a prisoner appeared before
the Board he was told to do something different in order to
obtain an early release."' Although the Department can
unilaterally change the credit requirements for lack of adapta-
bility, the hearing requirement should prevent abuses.
The maximum possible good time credit will result in a
four month reduction in sentence for every eight monthy
served.' Three months of each four month reduction are based
upon forebearance from illegal activities or prison disciplinary
infractions. These forbidden activities range from assault with
a weapon and escape to manufacture or sale of intoxicants.
Penalties for participation in these activities range from a
forty-five day reduction in credit for the most serious to a fif-
teen day reduction for the least serious.
In any case the Department may seek a criminal prosecu-
tion for violations of law. If the prisoner is prosecuted, he may
not be denied credit if found not guilty and he may be denied
credit at the specified rates if found guilty.' One month of
good time credit can be awarded for participation in prison
activities."'2 Success in the activity is not required for credit, if
a reasonable effort is made. However, failure to participate,
unless confined by choice or due to behavior problems, will
result in a maximum loss of thirty days credit for every eight
month period actually served.
The Bill's credit provisions provide some incentive to pris-
oners to better themselves and to reduce their sentences by not
committing additional crimes in prison.'2 3 Even if the inmate
119. See Transcript, supra note 5.
120. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 276, at 4824 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2931(b)).
121. Id. at 4825 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2932 (d)).
122. Id. at 4824 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2 931(c)).
123. Almost all prohibited activities are at least misdemeanors. The activities
prohibited by the bill and their penalties are as follows:
(1) Assault with a weapon; or escape.
(2) Physically assaultive behavior; possession of a weapon without per-
mission; attempt to escape; or urging others, with the intent to cause a
riot, to commit acts of force or violence, at a time and place under circum-
stances which produce a clear and present and immediate danger of a riot
which results in acts of force or violence.(3) Intentional destruction of state property valued in excess of fifty
dollars ($50); falsification of a significant record or document; possession
of escape tools without permission; or manufacture or sale of intoxicants.
Activities specified in paragraph (1) may result in a maximum denial of
[Vol. 17
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refuses to participate in prison activities and does all the for-
bidden activities, nothing except another felony conviction will
lengthen his term.'24
Denial of good time credit is possible only if certain time
limitations and procedures are observed." 5 First, credit can be
denied only within the eight month credit review period in
which the misbehavior takes place. Second, the Department
must follow a strict timetable for notifying the inmate of its
intent to deny credit and for proceeding with the denial hear-
ing. The Department must also meet specific notice require-
ments.Y25 Third, the inmate must be granted certain procedural
assistance and safeguards, including the right to request the
attendance of witnesses and to question all witnesses at the
hearing and the right to assistance by Department employees
in gathering facts and presenting the prisoner's defense." 7 Fi-
nally, the inmate must be notified within ten days of the hear-
ing of the results and reasons therefor, and he must be granted
not only Department, but also Community Release Board re-
view upon request. 2 '
Although the inmate does not have the full panoply of
procedural safeguards, substantial safeguards are provided,
and the proceeding to deny credit can not result in additional
criminal penalties to the inmate.'29
good behavior credit of 45 days for each such prohibited activity. Activi-
ties specified in paragraph (2) may result in a maximum denial of good
behavior credit of 30 days for each such prohibited activity. Activities
specified in paragraph (3) may result in a maximum denial of good be-
havior credit of 15 days for each such prohibited activity. Nothing in this
section shall prevent the Department of Corrections from seeking crimi-
nal prosecution for violations of law.
Id. (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2931(b)).
124. Such a system seems the best way to encourage efforts at "rehabilitation,"
even if they have no actual beneficial effect, without getting enmeshed in measuring
rehabilitation. Also, the provisions of the Bill do not completely shut the door on
rehabilitation. In the future if rehabilitation becomes understood, its effects can be
built into the sentencing system.
125. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 276, at 4824 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2932).
126. Id. (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2932(a)(1)).
127. Id. at 4825 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL. CODE § 2932(a)(2)-(6)).
128. Id. (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 2932(a)(7)).
129. It is possible that an inmate's right to credit could be considered so closely
related to his liberty that even more procedural safeguards may be necessary to meet
the requirements of due process. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 14-15 (specific consti-
tutional due process protections for criminal trials). Since a person's freedom is re-
stricted by a denial of good time almost as much as it is by a criminal conviction, full
criminal trial protections may be required. However, since the procedures provided for
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Every eight months the Department must recompute
prison time to be served on the basis of good time earned and
must notify each prisoner of his new release date. If credit
denial proceedings or criminal prosecutions prevent release of
a prisoner who otherwise would have been released, and he is
subsequently found not guilty, the time spent incarcerated
beyond the scheduled release date will be deducted from the
prisoner's parole period.'3 °
There were no good time provisions in the indeterminate
sentence law. Each sentence could vary anywhere within the
statutory minimum and maximum bounds. Procedural safe-
guards were not provided by law and were developed only on a
case by case basis. 3'
Although the new determinate sentence law will probably
be challenged in the courts on many procedural grounds, the
safeguards that are built into the law will prevent serious
abuses before the procedures can be tested. Moreover, the sub-
stantial documentation requirements will make review of any
case much more complete and accurate.
Parole
The last major procedural section of Senate Bill 42 deals
with parole.'12 Parole is a required period of Department of
Corrections supervision of an inmate after he is released from
prison. 33 For all inmates serving determinate sentences and
the Bill are already quite detailed and protective of a prisoner's rights, additional
safeguards should be imposed only if the courts find present procedures do not ade-
quately protect those rights.
130. See notes 133-43 and accompanying text infra (explanation of parole proce-
dure under the Bill).
131. The protections that were developed in the courts were often limited to very
narrow facts, leaving other areas unprotected until the appropriate case reached the
courts. For example, parole revocation and parole rescission procedures both involved
the withdrawing of liberty, but due process procedures were extended to one proceed-
ing long before they were extended to the other. Gee v. Brown, 14 Cal. 3d 571, 534 P.2d
716, 120 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1975); In re Prewith, 8 Cal. 3d 470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1972). Also, the documentation required by Adult Authority procedures was
inadequate, often limiting review to only the most glaring cases of abuse.
132. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 278 et seq., at 4826 (to be codified as CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 3000-65).
133. To anyone familiar with present concepts of parole, the parole period pro-
vided by the Bill looks like an additional period of supervision, and possibly of
incarceration if parole is revoked, after an individual's determinate sentence has been
served. Such an additional penalty could present constitutional due process problems
if viewed as an additional period of supervision and control without a trial and a
conviction. However, since all determinate sentences have a one year parole provision
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those serving indeterminate sentences less than life imprison-
ment, parole will be a period up to one year. Prisoners serving
indeterminate sentences with a life maximum will serve a pa-
role period up to three years. This parole can be waived by the
Community Release Board for good cause, and the inmate can
be released from custody immediately.
Major provisions of the Bill include specific guidelines for
every decision which must be made and procedural safeguards
to assure that each individual is treated fairly and equally and
has a right to some form of review.'34 The primary exception is
the parole waiver decision; no definition of good cause or fac-
tors to be considered are provided, nor is any procedure set up
for making and reviewing that decision.'35 The absence of
guidelines for this decision allows for disparity in its applica-
tion and will certainly lead to litigation even if the Community
Release Board adopts procedures paralleling other notice and
hearing procedures in the Bill.3 ' The legislature should remedy
this defect by providing standards for making the parole waiver
decision, by requiring documentation of the reasons for the
decision, and by providing a review procedure.
The remainder of the parole provisions deal with the pa-
role release decisions for inmates still serving indeterminate
sentences under Senate Bill 42. Within the first year of incar-
ceration of such an inmate, a Community Release Board
panel3 7 must meet with the inmate to review his file and make
recommendations. 38 Presumably these recommendations will
deal with the activities the inmate should engage in to assure
and since the defendant is warned at the sentencing hearing of the parole requirement
(id. § 273, at 4819 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.1)), each term should be
viewed as the determinate sentence plus one year of parole. Since the parole period
cannot exceed the one year maximum (id. § 278, at 4826 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 3000(d)), even if there is a subsequent conviction for a felony committed while
on parole, courts will probably interpret this period simply as part of each sentence,
thereby avoiding due process problems.
134. See, e.g., id. § 281.8, at 4827 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041.5)
(procedural requirements for hearings to review parole eligibility or the setting, post-
poning or rescinding of parole dates or the evaluation of a prisoner's appeal of good
time denial).
135. See id. § 278, at 4826 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000).
136. See note 130 supra. Some cases have already held that parole is a substan-
tial liberty. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Preston v. Piggman,
496 F.2d 270 (1974). If parole is a substantial liberty requiring due process protections,
surely the right to be free without parole is an even greater liberty entitled to at least
as much protection.
137. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1139, § 296, at 4833 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL
CODE § 5076.1) (provides for doing business in panels).
138. Id. § 281, at 4827 (to be codified as CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(a)).
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early release, similar to the conditions for granting good time
credit for a prisoner with a determinate sentence. 39
One year prior to the inmate's minimum eligible parole
release date,'"° a Community Release Board panel will meet
with the inmate and will set his parole release date. These
dates must be set in a manner that will provide uniform sent-
ences for similar offenses.' 4 ' The Judicial Council is authorized
to provide rules for the Board which will help promote uniform-
ity.
Subdivision (b) of section 3041 gives the Community Re-
lease Board authority to consider the protection of society by
refusing to set a parole release date if public safety so requires.
That subdivision makes reference to the "timing" of current or
past offenses as a factor which makes a more lengthy period of
incarceration necessary. Timing is not defined.'
CONCLUSIONS
Senate Bill 42 eliminates most of the problems of the inde-
terminate sentence while creating few of its own. It clearly
defines the purpose of sentencing and imposes numerous re-
quirements to assure that that purpose is met. Although the
resulting sentences can be questioned as too short for the ade-
quate protection of society,'43 the scheme of varied levels of
139. See notes 118-20 and accompanying text supra. For the information of the
Community Release Board and the protecton of the inmate, these recommendations
should be carefully documented and included in the inmate's file. Though these recom-
mendations will be more easily modified than conditions for granting good time credit
because of the indeterminate features of the inmate's term, careful documentation will
prevent the Board from making contradictory recommendations each time it meets
with the inmate and will allow the inmate to question changes in recommendations.
140. See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra (definition of parole release
date).
141. Uniformity was not a primary goal of the indeterminate sentence proce-
dures. See C.D. 75/20, supra note 8.
142. The only interpretation this author can imagine for the use of that word is
that the Community Release Board may consider whether there has been a rash of
crimes similar to the inmate's immediately prior to his release and whether the public
outcry at the release of such a prisoner would be too great to allow release. It does not
seem rational to postpone an individual's release because of the crimes of others. If
this interpretation of timing is correct, its use is certainly subject to challenge on due
process grounds.
143. Such a decision is purely a policy decision and should be made by the
legislature and not an administrative board. Under the indeterminate sentence system
this decision was made on a case-by-case basis and the result was disparity. The Adult
Authority's approach to the protection of society was expressed in a policy statement:
Felons committed to prison should be kept until there is reasonable cause
to believe they can lead crime-free lives in society. Doubt should be
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seriousness and proportionate levels of sentencing is consistent
with the punishment rationale. If additional punishment or
greater protection of society is deemed necessary, individual
sentences or the entire system can be skewed upward by adding
years or months to the sentences without increasing the dispar-
ity of the system or upsetting the goal of proportionality.
Determinate sentencing, when combined with the goal of
uniformity in sentencing crimes of similar gravity, eliminates
the disparity of sentences under an indeterminate sentencing
system. Merely having punishment as a purpose, a goal which
can be achieved, goes a long way toward improving the sent-
encing system. The procedural safeguards of careful documen-
tation, and adequate notice, hearing and review for every major
decision involving the inmate, erase the additional problems of
arbitrariness and insulation from review with which the inde-
terminate sentencing system was plagued. Finally, this deter-
minate sentencing system provides short enough sentences so
that even a supposedly rehabilitated individual who cannot be
detected need not serve very long.
The frustration of the indeterminate sentence system has
been eloquently expressed by Judge Marvin Frankel:
The sentence purportedly tailored to the cherished needs
of the individual turns out to be a crude order for simple
warehousing ...
...In a host of cases, then, when somebody says a
prisoner must stay locked up because he is not "ready" for
release, the ultimate Kafkaism is the lack of any definition
of "ready."" 4
With a determinate sentencing system that frustration should
be at an end.
Paula A. Johnson
resolved in favor of public protection. Prisoners who make a career of
criminal behavior forfeit their right to be treated leniently.
Violent, dangerous criminals and those who make a career of stealing
other persons' property will be confined until there is adequate assurance
they have been reformed.
Adult Authority Policy Statement No. 24 [on file at SANTA CLARA L. Rsv.].
144. FRANKEL, supra note 5, at 93.
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Appendix A
SUGGESq
Offense
Murder Ist
Murder 2nd
Manslaughter
Voluntary
Involuntary
Vehicle
Robbery Ist
Robbery 2nd
Arson
Assault
Burglary 1st
Burglary 2nd
Theft
Grand theft
Sexual crimes
Unlawful sexual intercourse
Controlled substances
(heroin; opium and its de-
rivatives; hallucinogens)
Possession
Possession for sale
Sale
Controlled substances (mari-
juana and dangerous drugs)
Possession
Possession for sale
Sale
Bribery
Prisoner with weapon
Escape
Ex-felon in possession
weapon
Sale or mfg. weapon
Parole violation
TED BASE RANGES FOR SENTENCES*
Typical Aggravated
(in months) (in months)
96-156
42-66
36-46
24-32
18-24
30-38
22-30
18-30
24-32
24-30
16-22
16-22
22-28
30-60
12-30
26-36
34-42
38-48
18-32
28-38
36-44
12-24
9-18
6-18
36-44
28-36
30-42
30-38
28-34
20-29
20-28
26-34
18-36
16-22
18-30
18-36
9-18
SUGGESTED ADJUSTMENT RANGES*
Prior Prison Terms Sentencing Status Subsequent Offenses
Less serious
(each) + (3-9) mos.
More serious
(each) + (9-24) mos.
Youthful Offender
- (6-18) mos.
Concurrent sentence
(each) + (3-12) mos.
Consecutive sentence
(each) + (12-24) mos.
Prior felony convictions
pled and proven
(each) + (0-9) mos.
*Derived from tables in C.D. 75/20, supra note 8.
Court convictions
(each) + (12-24) mos.
Disciplinary
Less serious
+ (3-9) mos.
More serious
+ (9-18) mos.
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Penalty Under Offense Penalty Under Indeterminate
S.B. 42 Sentencing
16 months, Accessory 6 months to 5 years
2 years or Misprison of treason 6 months to 5 years
3 years Threatening public official
to deter from duties 6 months to 5 years
Defrauding government 6 months to 5 years
Corrupt influencing of
jurors 6 months to 5 years
Escape from reformatory 6 months to 10 years
False report of secretion of
explosive 6 months to 3 years
Assault by public officer 6 months to 5 years
Assault with attempt to
commit felony except
murder 6 months to 15 years
Child/wife beating 6 months to 10 years
Bigamy 6 months to 10 years
Indecent exposure, 2d
conviction 1 year to life
Burglary 2d 1 year to 15 years
Forgery 1 year to 14 years
Receiving stolen property 6 months to 10 years
Wiretapping 6 months to. 3 years
Bribing executive officer
Perjury
Manslaughter
Mayhem
Robbery 1st
Robbery 2nd
Poisoning with intent to
kill
Assault with intent to
murder
Assault with intent to com-
mit rape, sodomy, mayhem,
robbery, grand larceny
Dueling resulting in death
Battery with serious bodily
injury
Assault with caustic
chemical
Assault with deadly weapon
Pimping
Child stealing
Sodomy with force
Lynching
Arson, not dwelling house
Burglary 1st
Counterfeiting
Grand theft
Extortion
1 year to 14 years
1 year to 14 years
6 months to 15 years
6 months to 14 years
5 years to life
1 year to life
10 years to life
1 year to 14 years
1 year to 20 years
1 year to 7 years
6 months to 5 years
1 year to 14 years
6 months to life
1 year to 10 years
6 months to 20 years
6 months to 5 years
6 months to 20 years
2 years to 20 years
5 years to life
1 year to 14 years
6 months to 10 years
I year to 10 years
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Appendix B
COMPARATIVE SENTENCES FOR SELECTED OFFENSES UNDER S.B. 42
AND INDETERMINATE SENTENCING SYSTEMS
2, 3 or 4
years
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
3, 4 or 5
years 1 year to 25 years
5 years to life
10 years to life
6 months to 15 years
3 years to life
5 years to life
1 year to life
5 years to life
10 years to 40 years
Kidnapping
Robbery of transportation
operator
Attempt to kill President
Assault with a deadly
weapon on a peace officer
Rape
Sodomy against will of
victim
Child molesting
Arson during emergency
Burglary with explosive
Prisoner holding hostage
in prison
5, 6 or 7 Murder 2d 5 years to life
years Rape with force or
violence 5 years to life
Murder 1st
Kidnapping resulting in
death of victim
life, special circumstances
capital punishment
life with or without possi-
bility of parole
5 years to life
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life imprison-
ment-no
special cir-
cumstances
